Autistic adults anticipate and integrate meaning based on the speaker’s voice: Evidence from eye-tracking and event-related potentials by Barzy, Mahsa et al.
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Barzy, Mahsa and Black, Jo and Williams, David M. and Ferguson, Heather J.  (2019) Autistic
adults anticipate and integrate meaning based on the speaker’s voice: Evidence from eye-tracking
and event-related potentials.   Journal of Experimental Psychology: General .       (In press)
DOI









Autistic adults anticipate and integrate meaning based on the speaker’s voice: Evidence 





Heather J Ferguson 
 




School of Psychology 
Keynes College 
University of Kent 
Canterbury 









Author note: All analysis procedures were pre-registered, and the full experimental materials,  






Typically developing (TD) individuals rapidly integrate information about a speaker and their 
intended meaning while processing sentences online. We examined whether the same 
processes are activated in autistic adults, and tested their timecourse in two pre-registered 
experiments. Experiment 1 employed the visual world paradigm. Participants listened to 
sentences where the speaker’s voice and message were either consistent or inconsistent (e.g. 
“When we go shopping, I usually look for my favourite wine”, spoken by an adult or a child), 
and concurrently viewed visual scenes including consistent and inconsistent objects (e.g. 
wine and sweets). All participants were slower to select the mentioned object in the 
inconsistent condition. Importantly, eye movements showed a visual bias towards the voice-
consistent object, well before hearing the disambiguating word, showing that autistic adults 
rapidly use the speaker’s voice to anticipate the intended meaning. However, this target bias 
emerged earlier in the TD group compared to the autism group (2240ms vs 1800ms before 
disambiguation). Experiment 2 recorded ERPs to explore speaker-meaning integration 
processes. Participants listened to sentences as described above, and ERPs were time-locked 
to the onset of the target word. A control condition included a semantic anomaly. Results 
revealed an enhanced N400 for inconsistent speaker-meaning sentences that was comparable 
to that elicited by anomalous sentences, in both groups. Overall, contrary to research that has 
characterised autism in terms of a local processing bias and pragmatic dysfunction, autistic 
people were unimpaired at integrating multiple modalities of linguistic information, and were 
comparably sensitive to speaker-meaning inconsistency effects.  
 
Keywords: spoken language comprehension, pragmatics, visual world paradigm, event 
related brain potentials, autism.  
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The process of inferring meaning from language is strongly influenced by the wider context, 
including verbal frame, tone of voice, gestures, and body language, and therefore falls within 
the pragmatics domain of language processing (Martin & McDonald, 2003). Pragmatic 
language use has recently been conceptualised within an extended account of situated 
language processing, known as the ‘social Coordinated Interplay Account’ (sCIA; Münster & 
Knoeferle, 2018). This account proposes that characteristics of both the comprehender and 
speaker, including their mood, education level, and social stereotypes, are taken into account 
online when interpreting language (Rodríguez, Burigo, & Knoeferle, 2016; Van Berkum, De 
Goede, Van Alphen, Mulder, & Kerstholt, 2013; Van Berkum, Van den Brink, Tesink, Kos, 
& Hagoort, 2008;). Hence, the social context is integrated with linguistic input in real-time 
when we process language. A much debated question remains when these characteristics 
(context dependent) and the sentence’s message (i.e. meaning of individual words, context 
free) are integrated to extract meaning, and which cognitive and social mechanisms underpin 
these processes.  
 Early research in this area postulated that individuals first extract the sentence’s 
message using syntax and semantics, and only refer to pragmatics to integrate the speaker’s 
identity at a later stage of processing (Cutler & Clifton 1999; Lattner & Friederici 2003; 
Osterhout, Bersick, & McLaughlin, 1997). For example, Lattner and Friederici (2003) 
recorded event related brain potentials (ERPs) while participants listened to sentences in 
which the gender of the speaker either matched or mismatched the meaning of the sentence in 
its usual/prototypical context (e.g. “I like to wear lipstick” spoken to by a female or male). 
They observed a posterior P600 effect when the speaker gender and sentence meaning 
mismatched. This posterior P600 effect has been interpreted as a marker for the detection of 
pragmatic violations (i.e. reintegrating information in the presence of an inconsistency 
between pragmatics and meaning inferences; Osterhout, et al., 1997; Spotorno, Cheylus, Van 
4 
 
Der Henst, & Noveck, 2013), and is distinct from the more widespread centrally distributed 
P600 component that is typically elicited by syntactic violations (Gouvea, Phillips, Kazanina, 
& Poeppel, 2010). Indeed, Lattner et al. associated this late posterior positivity (in the 
absence of any earlier effects in the N400 range) with participants using pragmatics at a later 
stage to integrate the speaker-related information (i.e. after processing the sentence’s 
message), and thus concluded that it supports the two-step account. However, these 
conclusions are somewhat limited by design features of the task, including an absence of 
filler sentences with syntactic violations, which could have provided a baseline measure of a 
syntactic P600 to contrast with the pragmatic P600 effect reported here. In addition, the 
gender stereotype violations were always sentence-final, meaning that the speaker-meaning 
effects were likely to be influenced by more global ‘wrap up effects’ (i.e. an increase in 
processing time at sentence end due to semantic integration processes; Schacht, Sommer, 
Shmuilovich, Martíenz, & Martín-Loeches, 2014; Stowe, Kaan, Sabourin, & Taylor, 2018).  
 An alternative view has been proposed, which suggests that the linguistic input and 
context are processed in a single step (“one step model”), as a joint action (Clark, 1996; 
Perry, 1997). Clark proposes that the non-verbal cues provided by the linguistic context (e.g. 
gestures, body language etc.) are processed in parallel with the linguistic input. This one step 
account is supported by empirical evidence from Van Berkum et al. (2008), who recorded 
ERPs while participants listened to sentences in which speaker and meaning were either 
consistent or inconsistent. In Van Berkum et al.’s study, speaker voices were manipulated in 
three ways: 1) age: child vs. adult (e.g. “I cannot sleep without my teddy in my arms”), 2) 
social class: lower vs. higher class accent (e.g. “I have a large tattoo on my back”), and 3) 
gender: male vs. female (e.g. “On weekends I usually go fishing by the river”). Note that 
critical words (underlined in the above examples) were always presented mid-sentence, 
which allowed sufficient time for participants to infer the speaker’s characteristics, and 
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avoided wrap-up effects. Van Berkum and colleagues examined effects on the N400 ERP 
component; a centroparietal negative-going deflection that is sensitive to stimulus 
predictability and semantic integration processes (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980; Nieuwland et al., 
2018). Results revealed a larger N400 effect for inconsistent compared to consistent 
sentences, with effects emerging as early as 200ms after the onset of the critical word, thus 
showing that speaker-related information is integrated at an early stage. These findings 
therefore support the one-step model of language processing, by demonstrating that 
interpretation of the sentence meaning is influenced concurrently by inferences about the 
speaker characteristics and the explicit message (i.e. ‘who is saying what’).  
 The rapid influence of social pragmatic information on meaning was subsequently 
replicated by Van den Brink and colleagues (2010), using ERPs. Importantly, Van den Brink 
et al. revealed that social information processing was enhanced among people who self-
reported high levels of empathy, using the Empathizing Questionnaire (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004). In contrast, people who self-reported low levels of empathy were 
consistently impaired in using information about social stereotypes during sentence 
comprehension. This pattern is consistent with previous research showing that high 
empathizers are better at predicting other people’s actions and responding to them 
appropriately (Saxe & Baron-Cohen, 2006). Moreover, it suggests that pragmatic processing 
can be influenced by individual preferences for bottom-up (i.e. language first) or top-down 
(i.e. rapid integration of voice-based information) language processing. 
 All of the issues discussed so far are relevant for our understanding of autism. Autism 
spectrum is a developmental disorder, diagnosed on the basis of behavioural difficulties in 
social communication, and restricted and repetitive behaviours/interests (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013; Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Shah, 
& Frith, 1993). Some researchers have proposed that the ability to empathise with others is 
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impaired among autistic people1 (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004), however this finding 
has been challenged more recently by evidence that the ability to deploy empathising abilities 
depends on the context. Thus, autistic people do not lack empathy but they may experience a 
specific difficulty empathising with TD individuals (and vice versa), since the two groups 
have different world experiences (Milton, Heasman, & Sheppard, 2018; Nicolaidis, Milton, 
Sasson, Sheppard, & Yergeau, 2018).  
Importantly, communication difficulties in autism are separable from basic language 
impairments; semantic language comprehension and syntactic preferences seem to be 
relatively spared among high functioning autistic individuals (e.g. Allen, Haywood, Rajedran, 
& Branigan, 2011; Hopkins, Yuill, & Keller, 2016; Howard, Liversedge, & Benson, 2017a; 
Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2003). However, some studies have shown that even when 
structural language skills are intact autistic people show deficits in processing linguistic 
information in context (i.e. successfully extracting the intended meaning), including difficulty 
using the sentence context to distinguish homographs (e.g. pronouncing tear in, “In her 
eye/dress there was a big tear”, Frith, & Snowling, 1983) or process non-literal utterances 
(e.g. “He drew a gun”, where the verb could mean drawing or pulling out, Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen, 1999; see also Connolly, 2001; Deliens, Papastamou, Ruytenbeek, Geelhand, & 
Kissine, 2018; Vulchanova, Saldaña, Chahboun, & Vulchanov, 2015). The validity and 
generalisability of these context impairments, however, have been questioned in recent years 
(e.g. Brock & Bzishvili, 2013; Brock & Caruana, 2014; Hahn, Snedeker, & Rabagliati, 2015). 
Moreover, eye-tracking research has revealed that autistic adults are delayed relative to age 
and IQ-matched TD peers in detecting passage level anomalies in text (i.e. where global 
coherence is required; Au-Yeung, Kaakinen, Liversedge, & Benson, 2018), and in detecting 
                                               
1 We acknowledge recent debates about the terminology used to describe autism, and in this paper adopt the 
identity-first language preferred by autistic adults who took part in the study by Kenny, Hattersley, Molins, 
Buckley, Povey, and Pellicano (2016). 
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implausible words in a sentence (Howard, Liversedge, & Benson, 2017b). These findings 
suggest that subtle differences may exist in the speed with which context is accessed and 
influences language processing in autism (c.f. Black, Barzy, Williams, & Ferguson, 2019; 
Black, Williams, & Ferguson, 2018; Ferguson, Black, & Williams, 2019). 
Traditionally, these pragmatic deficits have been linked to general difficulties 
integrating information in context (known as ‘weak central coherence’, WCC; Booth, & 
Happé, 2010; Frith, 1989; Martin, & McDonald, 2003;), given that autistic people tend to 
show a local, rather than global, processing bias (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happé, 1994; Happé & 
Frith, 2006). In turn, atypical attention distribution in autism (i.e. allocating attention to 
details and ignoring the context) has been attributed to impaired meta-learning abilities 
(known as the ‘predictive coding theory of autism’ or the ‘Bayesian brain’; Van Boxtel, & 
Lu, 2013; Van de Cruys, Evers, Van der Hallen, Van Eylen, Boets, de-Wit, & Wagemans, 
2014), which disrupts the ability to distinguish between important and less important 
prediction errors. These weaker priors mean that autistic individuals struggle to contextualise 
sensory input and make predictions based on experience, which is likely to affect many 
aspects of cognition, including language, memory, emotions, and motor skills (Pellicano & 
Burr, 2012). These weaker expectations of how people behave therefore mean that autistic 
people find it harder to process social information during communication, and are likely to 
show delays generating appropriate responses. Despite these converging accounts, there is 
little agreement on how a detail-focused cognitive style and weaker predictive processing 
style might influence the quality of social interactions. This raises the question of whether the 
mechanisms involved in integrating social pragmatic information and language meaning are 
disrupted among autistic individuals who experience impaired use of context and atypical 
social inferencing. This is an important topic to investigate, because as well as further 
informing theoretical models of pragmatic language comprehension and shedding light on the 
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nature of these social impairments, it has the potential to help practitioners develop specific 
interventions or learning shortcuts to improve the quality of social interactions in autism.  
In this paper, we present two fully pre-registered experiments that used eye-tracking 
(Experiment 1) and ERP (Experiment 2) methods to investigate whether and how real-time 
pragmatic processing of spoken language is affected when global coherence and social 
abilities are compromised. Specifically, we tested whether autistic adults differ significantly 
from matched neurotypical controls in the timecourse with which they anticipate meaning 
based on a speaker’s characteristics (i.e. their age, gender or social status), and whether they 
manifest equivalent disruptions during language integration when speaker and meaning 
information are inconsistent.  
Experiment 1 examined the timecourse with which listeners predict meaning based on 
characteristics inferred from the speaker’s voice. We used the classic visual world paradigm 
to address this question by recording participants’ eye movements around a visual scene that 
contained images depicting objects/events that were consistent or inconsistent with the 
speaker’s voice (Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995). 
The visual world paradigm has been used extensively in psycholinguistic research to show 
that participants incorporate cues from syntax, semantics and world knowledge to constrain 
the available set of objects, and move their eyes to an appropriate visual object before it has 
been mentioned in the audio (e.g. Altmann & Kamide, 2007, 2009; Kamide, Lindsay, 
Scheepers, & Kukona, 2016). For example, it has been shown that participants are more 
likely to look at an empty glass of wine compared to a full glass of beer when hearing the 
sentence “the man has drunk all of…”, and vice versa for “the man will drink all of …” 
(Altmann & Kamide, 2007). This paradigm therefore provides a valuable implicit measure of 
expectation in real-time, though it has never before been used to examine the timecourse with 
which listeners infer meaning from a speaker’s voice characteristics. In the current study, we 
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tested whether participants’ predictive eye movements towards visual objects (e.g. a shaver 
vs. car) were modulated by inferences from the speaker’s voice (e.g. whether an adult vs. 
child said, “On my last birthday, I got an expensive electric …”). This paradigm enabled us 
to examine for the first time whether and how autistic adults implicitly integrate pragmatic 
cues to predict meaning, and how these processes compare to those engaged by age, IQ and 
gender matched TD adults. Participants’ explicit ability to infer meaning from a speaker’s 
voice was measured using the ‘Reading the Mind in the Voice’ task (Golan, Baron-Cohen, 
Hill, & Rutherford, 2007; Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2002), and their 
local/global processing bias was measured using a sentence completion task (Booth & Happé, 
2010).   
 Experiment 2 sought to explore the timecourse with which listeners integrate 
semantic and pragmatic cues, and respond to inconsistencies in speaker and meaning. To this 
end, we replicated Van Berkum et al.’s (2008) study, using ERPs to compare the brain’s 
electrophysiological responses to words that were consistent or inconsistent with 
characteristics inferred from the speaker’s voice (e.g. “I cannot sleep without my teddy in my 
arms”, spoken by a child or an adult), among adult participants with and without autism. In 
addition, we extended the paradigm to include a semantic anomaly condition using the same 
content (e.g. “I cannot sleep without my pizza in my arms”), that provided a baseline measure 
of anomaly detection N400 responses in each participant group. The addition of this semantic 
anomaly condition serves to overcome the possible limitation of Van Berkum et al.’s study, 
which tested the N400 effect to semantic anomalies in a completely different set of sentences.   
 First, if the linguistic input and context are processed in a single parallel step, we 
expected TD participants in Experiment 1 to initiate anticipatory eye movements towards the 
image that was consistent with the speaker’s voice long before the disambiguating target 
word was uttered (e.g. shaver/car). In Experiment 2, we predicted an enhanced N400 effect 
10 
 
for inconsistent sentences relative to consistent ones, which would be comparable in 
timecourse to the N400 elicited by semantically anomalous sentences. In contrast, a two-step 
account would predict that effects of pragmatic fit would be delayed, as lexical-semantic fit 
would be prioritised in the early stages in processing.  
 Second, we considered how these processes may be influenced among autistic people, 
and compared predictions for accounts that characterise autistic people as having a general 
deficit in contextual integration (e.g. Behrmann, Thomas, & Humphreys, 2006; Happé, & 
Frith, 2006; Koldewyn, Jiang, Weigelt, & Kanwisher, 2013), with the predictions of accounts 
that imply global integration ability is not universally impaired in autism (e.g. Mottron, 
Burack, Iarocci, Belleville, & Enns, 2003; Plaisted, Dobler, Bell, & Davis, 2006; Van der 
Hallen, Evers, Brewaeys, Van den Noortgate, & Wagemans, 2015; following the results of 
Black et al., 2018, 2019; Ferguson et al., 2019). Based on the former, we predicted that in 
Experiment 1 autistic individuals would be slower than TD individuals to direct anticipatory 
gaze to the speaker-relevant image, and would experience greater interference from the 
semantic competitor (i.e. a weaker target bias). In Experiment 2, we predicted that the autism 
group would show a delayed, reduced or absent N400 response when integrating inconsistent 
speaker-meaning information. Alternatively, if pragmatic processing is largely spared in 
autism (as it appears to be for semantic processing), then no between-group differences in the 
anticipation or integration of social pragmatic meaning should emerge. 
   
Experiment 1 
All methodological procedures were pre-registered on the Open Science Framework (OSF) 





Participants, including those with and without autism were recruited using the Autism 
Research at Kent (ARK) database. Participants on the database were initially recruited from a 
community sample in the areas of Kent, Essex and London in the U.K., using a variety of 
recruitment strategies (e.g., newspaper adverts, contacting local groups, autism support 
groups and word-of-mouth). We deliberately avoided using university students to minimise 
differences in socioeconomic status between the groups. A total of fifty adult participants 
were initially recruited, but two were excluded from both experiments: one due to technical 
errors during EEG recording, and one due to excessive noise during EEG recording (i.e. 
>25% data loss). Hence, both Experiments 1 and 2 included 24 autistic adults and 24 TD 
adults, which is in accordance with our pre-registered sample size. These sample sizes were 
chosen a-priori based on the sample size used in Van Berkum et al.’s study (2008; N = 24), 
and to be comparable or even exceed the sample sizes used in previous research that has 
examined eye movements in autistic and TD adults (e.g. Au-Yeung et al., 2014, 2018; Black 
et al., 2018; 2019; Brock, Norbury, Einav, & Nation, 2008; Ferguson et al., 2019; Howard et 
al., 2017ab). Post-hoc calculations of power were conducted given the current sample size 
using the simr package in R (Green & MacLeod, 2016), and returned an estimated power of 
100% with the significance level of α=.05 on 80% of occasions (as suggested by Cohen, 
1988) for Experiment 1.  
 Groups were matched on age, verbal IQ2 and gender (as measured by the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; WASI; Wechsler, 1999; see Table 1 for demographic 
information), were native English speakers, and did not have a diagnosis of dyslexia or 
reading comprehension impairment. Participants in the TD group did not report any current 
                                               
2 Note that the autistic group scored significantly higher on PIQ. Therefore, in addition to the full-sample 
analyses, we ran analyses among subsamples of autistic and TD participants that were matched for PIQ (by 
excluding one participant from each group with the highest and lowest PIQ scores). Crucially, none of the 
statistical results from the experimental task changed substantively with this smaller matched sample (i.e. no p 
value changed from significant to non-significant or vice versa). 
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psychiatric diagnoses. All participants completed the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) to measure self-reported autistic 
traits. 
      
  Autistic Typically developing t-value p-value Cohen’s d 
  (n=24) (n=24) 
Sex (m:f)  18:6  18:6 - - - 
Age (years) 32.58 (2.23) 31.75 (2.21) .27 .792 .08 
Verbal IQ 105.46 (2.51) 101.46 (1.80) 1.29 .202 .37 
Performance IQ 112.75 (3.84) 102.29 (2.36) 2.32    .025 * .67 
Total AQ 30.92 (1.75)   18.05 (1.64) 5.35 <.001 *** 1.58 
ADOS2 Module4 7.79 (0.99) - - - - 
      
      
Table 1. Demographic information (means and std. errors) of participants in each group, 
where * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
In accordance with DSM-IV or 5, all autistic participants had a formal diagnosis of 
Autistic Disorder, Asperger’s Syndrome, or Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not-
Otherwise Specified (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). To assess the current autistic 
characteristics, all the autistic participants were also assessed on module 4 of the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) by a trained, research-reliable 
researcher, and videos were double coded to ensure reliability of scoring (see Table 1; inter-
rater reliability was found to be excellent with intraclass correlation of .89). Eleven 
individuals in the autistic group scored higher than 7 on the ADOS (i.e. the cut off score).  
 
Materials 
Eye-tracking task  
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Twenty-four experimental sentences were created based on those used in Van Berkum et al. 
(2008). Each item described a person’s preferences, or activities. The final word in each 
sentence was manipulated across two conditions so that the lexical content either matched a 
specific speaker’s stereotypical characteristics or not (speaker-consistent vs speaker-
inconsistent). For example, the sentence “When we go shopping, I usually look for my 
favourite sweets” is consistent with social stereotypes for a child, but the sentence “When we 
go shopping, I usually look for my favourite wine” is inconsistent with expectations for a 
child. Each experimental sentence was recorded by two contrasting speakers, resulting in four 
versions of each item, with social stereotypes manipulated in three ways- 1) Age: child vs 
adult (see above example), 2) Class: higher vs lower class accent (e.g. “I never smoke inside, 
because my wife doesn’t like the smell of cigars/rollies), 3) Gender: female vs male (e.g. 
“Before starting my new job, I need to buy a new skirt/tie”). Twenty-four filler sentences 
were also included (e.g. “It was Valentine’s Day so I bought her a bunch of red roses”), 
which didn’t include any inconsistent content.  
 Ten different speakers were recruited to record the sentences. One female and one 
male adult speaker read eight items in the ‘gender’ category (four sentences per item). Two 
children (one female and one male, aged 6 and 8 respectively) and two adults (one female 
and one male) read eight items in the ‘age’ category. Finally, four professional actors (2 
females and 2 males) were recruited from local drama groups to read eight items in typically 
high or low socio-economic British accents for the ‘class’ category. Audios were recorded in 
a sound proof room using a digital voice recorder. One female and one male adult speaker 
read the filler sentences (12 sentences each). All speakers were native speakers of English.  
 To verify that listeners inferred the intended social stereotypes from speaker’s voices, 
we conducted a post-test, in which 22 TD participants (10 males, 12 females) listened to each 
item then used a 5-point sliding scale to rate “how normal or strange do you think it is to have 
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the speaker say this particular thing” (1 = completely normal, 5 = very strange). Overall, 
inconsistent speaker-meaning combinations were rated as significantly more strange than 
consistent speaker-meaning combinations (M = 2.39 vs 1.76, t(77) = 10.22, p < .001). In 
addition, we tested the effect of consistency separately for each speaker type (i.e. age, gender 
and class). This analysis confirmed that inconsistent speaker-meaning combinations were 
rated as significantly more strange than consistent speaker-meaning combinations in all three 
speaker categories: Age (t(77) = 9.09, p < .001), Class (t(77) = 2.62, p = .011), and Gender 
(t(77) = 8.23, p <.001).   
 Each of the twenty-four experimental sentences was paired with an image that 
depicted four different objects (see open materials on OSF, https://osf.io/7hna3/). Two 
objects in each image were semantically relevant to the sentence (e.g. edible objects for the 
supermarket example). One of these was consistent with social stereotypes about the speaker 
(subsequently referred to as the target picture, e.g. a picture of ‘sweets’ when the sentence 
was read by a child), and the other was inconsistent with social stereotypes about the speaker 
(subsequently referred to as the competitor picture, e.g. a picture of ‘wine’ when the sentence 
was read by a child). The remaining two pictures depicted distractor objects that were 
irrelevant to the sentence content (e.g. a house, a lake). Filler items were also paired with 
images that included four pictures, but only one picture matched the lexical content of the 
sentence (e.g. red roses in the example above). Each individual picture measured 400x400 
pixels, with the complete image comprising four pictures on a white background measuring 
960x720 pixels, with the position of target, competitor and distractor pictures 
counterbalanced across items. 
 
Revised ‘Reading the Mind in the Voice’ task (RMIV) 
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Participants’ explicit recognition of meaning from voices was assessed using the RMIV task. 
In this task, developed by Golan et al. (2007), participants listened to 25 different excerpts of 
speech and had to judge how each person was feeling (only based on their voice) from a 
choice of four options (e.g. “angry, derogatory, resentful or nostalgic”). There was no time 
limit for participants to respond, although they were encouraged to respond as quickly as they 
could. Participant’s accuracy was recorded.         
 
Linguistic Central Coherence task  
Participants’ local processing bias during language processing was measured using a sentence 
completion task. In this task, participants were asked to complete 14 sentences that required 
global sentence completions. For example, the sentence fragment, “in the sea there are fish 
and….” could be completed with a locally biased word “chips”, or with a globally biased 
word like “sharks” or “crabs”. Participants’ responses and their reaction times were recorded.  
 
Procedure 
The Psychology Research Ethics Committee at the University of Kent granted approval to 
conduct this study. For the eye-tracking task, participants’ dominant eye was tracked with an 
EyeLink 1000 Plus eye-tracker and participants listened to the sentences through headphones. 
Head movement was minimised with the use of a fixed chin rest. Images were presented on a 
VDU approximately 70cm in front of the participants’ eyes. Calibration was performed using 
a 9-point procedure. Before each trial, a central drift correction was conducted to verify the 
calibration accuracy. Participants were asked to listen to each sentence and look at the 
images, and used the mouse to click on the picture that was mentioned in the sentence as 
quickly as possible. Images appeared on screen 1000ms before the onset of related audio, and 
stayed onscreen until the participant clicked the mouse to move on. Participants’ picture 
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selection accuracy, reaction times (time-locked to the onset of the target picture), and eye-
movements across the whole trial were recorded. The next trial began following a 500ms 
blank screen. The first two items were filler trials to ensure participants understood the task. 
Following presentation of these, the 24 experimental items were randomly interleaved with 
22 filler items, with a break offered half way through. Participants saw each item once, in one 
of the four conditions. Item order and condition was randomised across four lists, and the 
presentation of each list was randomised among participants. Each participant completed the 
eye-tracking and RMIV tasks on the same day as the EEG task reported in Experiment 2. The 
whole testing session took about 2 hours including EEG setup and breaks.  
 
Results 
All analysis procedures were pre-registered, and the full experimental materials, datasets and 




Accuracy scores were analysed using a generalised linear mixed model, using the ‘lme4’ 
package in RStudio software Version 1.1.453 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2018; R 
Core Team, 2016). Group (autistic vs TD) was included in the model as a fixed effect and 
was contrast coded: (-.5 vs .5). We applied the maximal random effects structure, by 
including participants and items as random effects, and Group as a random slope on items (as 
suggested by Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). The analysis revealed that autistic 
participants were significantly less accurate at explicitly recognising speakers’ emotions 
based on their voice compared to TD participants (M = 65% vs M = 70%; Est = .41, SE = .20, 




Linguistic Central Coherence task  
Similar to Booth and Happé (2010), a 3-point scoring system was used to analyse responses. 
Two points were given if participants provided a global sentence completion word/phrase 
within 10 seconds, and 1 point was assigned if they took longer than 10 seconds or provided 
no response. If they used a local sentence completion word/phrase, then 0 points were 
assigned. Response scores were analysed using a linear mixed model. Group (autistic vs TD) 
was included in the model as a fixed effect and was contrast coded: (-.5 vs .5). The maximal 
random effects structure included participants and items as random effects, and Group as a 
random slope on items. The analysis revealed no difference between groups in terms of 
global/local sentence completion bias (autistic vs TD; M = 1.75 vs M = 1.73; Est. = -.02, SE = 
.10, t = -.21, p = .832). 
 
Eye-tracking task 
Accuracy: Accuracy of selecting the mentioned picture was analysed using a generalised 
linear mixed model, with Group (autistic vs TD) and Condition (consistent vs inconsistent) as 
contrast coded fixed effects (-.5 vs .5). The maximal random effects structure that fit the data 
included participants and items as random effects, with Condition as a random slope on items 
and participants. Participants were highly accurate at choosing the mentioned picture (autistic 
vs TD, M = 97% vs 98%), and this did not differ between groups (Est. = 1.57, z = 0.82, p = 
.412) or conditions (Est. = -7.56, z = -1.29, p = .196).  
 
Reaction times: Only trials on which participants accurately clicked on the mentioned object 
were included in the analysis. In addition, response times that fell more than 2.5 standard 
deviations from the individual’s mean reaction time were excluded from analysis. These steps 
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removed 4.25% of the original data. Statistics were performed using a linear mixed model, 
including the same fixed effects structure as the accuracy analysis, and the maximal random 
effects structure to fit the data (Group and Condition as random slopes on items, and 
Condition as a random slope on participants). Mean response times per condition are shown 
in Figure 1.  
 Results showed that participants were faster to select the mentioned object when the 
speaker characteristics were consistent with the mentioned object than when the speaker 
characteristics were inconsistent (M = 1572ms vs 1729ms; Est = 158.81, SE = 45.81, t = 3.47, 
p = .002). Reaction times did not differ by Group (Est = -137.02, t = .80, p = .427), nor did 
Group modulate the effect of Consistency (Est = -10.77, t = .14, p = .888).   
 
 
      
Figure 1. Target selection response times for each condition and group, Experiment 1, 
showing raw data points, a horizontal line reflecting the condition mean, and a rectangle 




Eye movement data processing: Eye movements were time-locked to the onset of the 
sentence-final disambiguating word (e.g. ‘sweets’ or ‘wine’), and were analysed in two 
separate time periods: anticipatory period (eye movements in the 3000ms before 
disambiguating word onset, reflecting listeners’ expectations about forthcoming language 
input) and integration period (eye movements in the 1000ms after disambiguating word 
onset, reflecting the ease with which incoming language is integrated with expectations). 
Four areas of interest (AOIs) were defined around the pictures of objects in each visual scene: 
target (the object that matched both the semantic context of the sentence and the speaker’s 
voice), competitor (matched the semantic context but not the speaker’s voice), and two 
distractors (did not match either semantic context or the speaker’s voice).   
 Eye movements during the anticipation period were analysed across consistency 
conditions, since listeners had not yet heard the consistent/inconsistent critical word, so 
expectations should be solely driven by inferences from the speaker’s voice. Thus, 
anticipatory analyses tested whether participants in each group differed in their likelihood of 
fixating the speaker-relevant target picture or speaker-irrelevant competitor picture, and 
whether these preferences emerged over a different time course for each group. To fulfil this 
aim, fixations during the 3000ms anticipatory period were broken down into 20ms time bins, 
and the spatial coordinates were mapped onto AOIs as a function of time. Visual preferences 
to target or competitor pictures were represented by a binary term in each 20ms time bin, 
where ‘1’ indicated a fixation on the target/competitor and ‘0’ indicated no fixation. The 
resulting data was analysed separately for target and competitor biases using generalised 
mixed models and growth curve analysis (Mirman, Dixon, & Magnuson, 2008), using the 
‘lme4’ and ‘eyetrackingR’ packages in RStudio. We note that our pre-registration proposed 
to analyse the probability of fixating the target and competitor images as a function of time 
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using permutation and cluster analysis, and did not specify the use of growth curve analysis. 
We chose to use growth curve analysis to examine anticipatory effects of linguistic context 
(permutation and cluster analyses were used to examine integration, as detailed below) 
following more recent statistical norms in the field. Fitting models to the data to test different 
shapes of visual bias over time allows us to capture effects of group as the sentence unfolded, 
while also testing for variance between and within individuals. In this study, third-degree 
orthogonal polynomials, incorporating intercept, linear, quadratic and cubic components, 
were used to model the timecourse of anticipatory bias over the 3000ms period (see Mirman 
et al., 2008). Thus, final models included a contrast coded fixed effect for Group (-.5 vs .5) 
alongside the time polynomials, and random effects of participants and items. The final 
model also included Group as a random slope within items. Resulting statistical effects are 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Statistical results from the growth curve analysis examining anticipatory fixations 
towards the Target and Competitor objects in Experiment 1. Ot1, ot2 and ot3 refer to linear, 
quadratic and cubic models of time, respectively, and * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
        
  Target   Competitor 
 Est. SE z-value  Est. SE z-value 
Group 0.06 0.08 0.77  -0.04 0.09 -0.39 
ot1 2.11 0.07 28.45 ***  1.51 0.11 13.49 *** 
ot2 0.49 0.07 6.54 ***  -0.44 0.11 -3.96*** 
ot3 0.47 0.07 6.30 ***  -0.03 0.11 -0.24 
Group*ot1 0.2 0.15 1.35  -0.96 0.15 -6.27*** 
Group*ot2 0.06 0.15 0.4  0.18 0.15 1.2 
Group*ot3 -0.64 0.15 -4.28 ***   -0.26 0.15 -1.73 
 
 
 Follow-up analyses explored whether and when anticipatory biases to the target or 
competitor picture exceeded chance level (i.e. .25) for each group. Thus, we ran cluster-based 
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permutation analysis by participants (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007) to compare the proportion 
of target or competitor fixations during the anticipatory period to chance, using the 
‘eyetrackingR’ package in RStudio. First, we computed a 1-sample test statistic for each of 
the 20ms timebins, comparing each sample to chance (.25). Next, we clustered together 
adjacent timebins for which the test statistic was significant at the .05 level, and calculated a 
cluster-level test statistic as the sum of the test statistics for the individual timebins within a 
particular cluster. Finally, a simulation with 2000 randomly permuted samples was run to 
determine the likelihood of obtaining a significant cluster by chance. Permutation analyses 
included random effects for participants. 
 Eye movements during the integration period examined when participants in each 
group identified the consistent/inconsistent word, and how quickly they were able to switch 
their attention away from the target image to the competitor image in the inconsistent 
condition. To this end, fixations during the 1000ms integration period were broken down into 
20ms time bins, and the spatial coordinates were mapped onto AOIs as a function of time. 
Visual preferences to target or competitor pictures were represented by a binary term in each 
20ms time bin, where ‘1’ indicated a fixation on the target/competitor and ‘0’ indicated no 
fixation. The resulting data was analysed separately for each group, and for target and 
competitor biases, using a similar cluster-based permutation analysis approach to that 
described for the anticipation period. Crucially, here we used paired-samples t-tests to 
compare the proportion of target or competitor fixations in each 20ms sample between 
consistent and inconsistent conditions. This allowed us to identify when a significant 
difference in visual biases emerged between consistent and inconsistent conditions in each 
group. Permutation analyses included random effects for participants. Statistical effects for 
the permutation analyses, for both anticipatory and integration periods, are shown in Table 3. 
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 Figure 2 plots the proportion of fixations to the target and competitor pictures in each 
group for every 20ms time bin from 3000ms before disambiguating word onset. Figure 3 
plots the proportion of fixations to the target and competitor pictures in each consistency 





Table 3. Statistical results from the permutation t-test analyses comparing anticipatory and integratory biases towards the Target and Competitor 
objects to chance in Experiment 1, where * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
Cluster No. Start Time End Time SumT Cluster No. Start Time End Time SumT
Autistic
1 -3000 -2940 7.13 1 -2200 -1900 8
2 -2300 -2160 17.46 2 -1500 -1200 8.02
3 -2100 -2080 2.03 3 -1000 -300 22.31 **
4 -2060 -2000 6.9 4 -200 -100 2.15
5 -1960 -1940 2.32
6 -1840 -1820 2.11
7 -1800 0 392.02 ***
Typically developing
1 -2680 -2660 2.14 1 -1700 -1500 4.11
2 -2240 -1520 115.4 *** 2 -1100 -700 9.61
3 -1500 -1400 10.98 3 -600 -500 2.43
4 -1360 -1320 4.49 4 -200 0 5.38
5 -1020 -1000 2.28
6 -960 0 182.83 ***
Autistic
1 300 1000 90.68 *** 1 400 1000  -93.07 ***
Typically developing

















Anticipatory fixations towards target: As is clear in Figure 2, preference to fixate the target 
object increased over the 3000ms anticipatory period, reflected in significant effects on the 
linear, quadratic and cubic fit curves. More importantly, Group significantly interacted with 
the cubic fit, revealing that while both groups clearly exhibited an increasing target 
preference prior to disambiguation, participants in the TD group exhibited shallower 
curvature- a slower rate of target bias increase- compared to the autistic group. Permutation 
tests confirmed that TD participants first showed a significant bias to fixate the target from 
2240ms before disambiguation (SumT = 115.40, p < .001), but this subsequently plateaued 
between 1500ms and 1000ms, then rapidly increased from 960ms onwards (SumT = 182.83, 
p < .001). In contrast, autistic participants showed a sustained and increasing bias to fixate 
the target from 1800ms before disambiguation onwards (SumT = 392.02, p = .001).  
 
Anticipatory fixations towards competitor: A significant effect on the linear fit curve revealed 
that overall preference to fixate the competitor object increased over the 3000ms anticipatory 
period. Importantly, this linear fit interacted significantly with Group, showing that the 
autistic group exhibited a steeper rise in looks to the competitor compared to the TD group. 
Permutation tests revealed that while TD participants never fixated the competitor above 
chance level during the 3000ms anticipation period (all ps > .05), autistic participants showed 
a significant bias to fixate the competitor between 1000ms and 300ms before disambiguation 






     
Figure 2. Timecourse of anticipatory fixations towards the target (left panel) and competitor (right panel) pictures for each group, in Experiment 
1, showing the best fit curves for the data and 95% confidence interval shadow. Horizontal lines show clusters of time where the fixations 
towards the target exceeded chance (* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001). 
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Integration fixations towards target: The timecourse plots in Figure 3 reveals that looks to 
the target continued to rise when the mentioned object was consistent with the speaker 
characteristics, but showed a steep decrease when the mentioned object was inconsistent with 
the speaker characteristics. Permutation analysis showed that in the autistic group, a 
significant difference in fixations towards the target emerged between consistent and 
inconsistent conditions from 300ms after the disambiguating word (SumT = 90.68, p < .001). 
In contrast, the TD group showed this same effect from 400ms after the disambiguating word 
(SumT = 102.81, p < .001).   
 
Integration fixations towards competitor: The timecourse plots in Figure 3 reveals that looks 
to the competitor rose steeply when the mentioned object was inconsistent with the speaker 
characteristics, but decreased when the mentioned object was consistent with the speaker 
characteristics. Permutation analysis revealed that a significant difference in fixations 
towards the competitor emerged between consistent and inconsistent conditions from 400ms 
after the disambiguating word in both the autistic (SumT = -93.07, p < .001) and TD group 
(SumT = -105.70, p < .001).              
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Figure 3. Timecourse of integration fixations towards the target (top panels) and competitor 
(bottom panels) for each consistency condition and group, Experiment 1. The horizontal lines 
above them show the points at which the fixations towards the AOI in different condition first 
became significant.     
 
Summary 
The results of Experiment 1 revealed that participants in both groups accurately used the 
speaker’s voice to anticipate the speaker’s intended message. Participants were slower to 
select the mentioned object when it was inconsistent with the speaker’s voice than when it 
was consistent with the speaker’s voice. The influence of speaker expectations was also 
evident in the eye movement data as participants in both groups showed a strong and 
increasing preference to fixate the object that was consistent with speaker’s voice (i.e. the 
target) long before hearing the disambiguating word. Importantly, the nature and timing of 
28 
 
these visual biases showed subtle differences between groups. Specifically, the target bias 
emerged earlier among participants in the TD group (TD: 2240ms vs autistic: 1800ms prior to 
disambiguation), but showed shallower curvature, as the bias stalled before a final rapid 
increase from 960ms before the disambiguation point. In contrast, participants in the autistic 
group showed a consistent steep increase in the visual bias towards the speaker-consistent 
object from 1800ms before the disambiguation point. Interestingly, only the autistic group 
showed an above-chance bias to fixate the competitor during this anticipatory period. As 
expected, following the disambiguating word, participants in both groups made increasing 
fixations towards the mentioned object, regardless of whether it was consistent or 
inconsistent with the speaker expectations. As in the anticipatory period, some subtle 
differences emerged between groups; the autistic group were faster to switch away from the 
target in the inconsistent condition compared to the TD group (300ms vs 400ms respectively). 
Both groups were equally fast to switch to the competitor in this inconsistent condition.  
Taken together, these findings provide strong evidence that participants used the voice 
to infer characteristics of the speaker, and rapidly anticipated their intended meaning. This 
finding provides further evidence for the one step model of language processing by showing 
that the relevant knowledge and social context are processed hand-in-hand with semantics to 
facilitate language processing (Clark, 1996; Perry, 1997). The fact that these online voice-
based inferences of meaning were generated by autistic adults is important because this is in 
contrast with several prominent theories of autism, including the WCC theory, suggesting 
that autism is associated with a tendency to process the information locally first and only later 
switching to global processing and using the context, including the social context (Booth, & 
Happé, 2010; Frith, & Happé, 1994). Nevertheless, the subtle differences in timing and 
strength of effects revealed by eye-tracking suggest that the autistic group had weaker 
speaker-meaning expectations, perhaps due to greater interference from the competitor or 
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having weaker social stereotypes. In addition, TD participants’ eye movements showed a 
clear cubic pattern of looks to the target over time (i.e. an increasing bias towards the target, 
followed by a plateau, then a final increase until disambiguation), though they never fixated 
the competitor object above chance. It is possible that this temporary reduction of the target 
bias reflects greater exploration of the visual scene and the irrelevant distractor objects 
among participants in the TD group compared to the autistic group (Heaton & Freeth, 2016). 
 In Experiment 2, we sought to further examine how people integrate these social 
contrasts using event-related potentials (ERPs). ERPs were recorded while participants 
listened to sentences that were either consistent or inconsistent with the speaker’s 
characteristics. We predicted that there will be a larger N400 effect while participants hear 
the sentences in the inconsistent condition compared to the consistent one. In other words, 
they will show greater difficulty to integrate the sentence when there is a social contrast. We 
predicted that if autistic individuals have problems to integrate the information from context, 
then they would show less sensitivity while hearing these social contrasts (i.e. an absent or a 
reduced N400 effect in this group). We also included semantic anomalous sentences as a 




This experiment was conducted concurrently with Experiment 1, hence the participants were 
identical to those described in Experiment 1 (N=48). This sample size was defined a-priori to 
match that used (for each group) in Van Berkum et al. (2008), and it is comparable to or 
exceeds the sample sizes of previous studies that have used EEG to study language in autism 
(e.g. Coderre, Chernenok, Gordon, & Ledoux, 2017; Korpilahti et al., 2007; Pijnacker, 
Geurts, Van Lambalgen, Buitelaar, & Hagoort, 2010; Lartseva, Dijkstra Kan, & Buitelaar, 
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2014). Nevertheless, post-hoc power calculations showed an estimated power of 
approximately 38% to detect a significant 4-way interaction. We would have needed more 
than 135 participants (i.e. ~68 autistic individuals, as well as ~68 age- and IQ-matched 
controls) to reach 80% power, which would not be feasible using these complex methods and 
given the difficulties associated with recruiting and testing autistic people. 
All methodological procedures were pre-registered on the Open Science Framework 
(OSF) web pages (see https://osf.io/7hna3/).  
 
Materials 
The experimental and filler sentences used in this study were based on those used in Van 
Berkum et al.’s study (2008). 160 speaker-consistent and speaker-inconsistent experimental 
sentences were translated from Dutch to English, and adapted to ensure they matched English 
sociocultural stereotypes, names and places. Each sentence included a single, sentence 
medial, critical word that was either consistent or inconsistent with the speaker (critical words 
are underlined in the following examples). There were 40 sentences in the age category: 20 
adult vs 20 child type sentences (e.g. “I drink a glass of wine every night before I go to 
sleep”, “I cannot sleep without my teddy in my arms”), 40 sentences in the class category: 20 
stereotypical high class vs 20 stereotypical lower class type sentences (“Every month, we go 
to the opera for a night out”, “I have a large tattoo on my back”) and 80 sentences in the 
gender category: 40 stereotypical female vs 40 stereotypical male type sentences (e.g. “I 
bought a very comfortable bra from an expensive shop”, “Every week I trim my beard with a 
small pair of scissors”). A third semantic anomaly condition was created by replacing the 
critical word in each sentence with a semantically anomalous word (e.g. I cannot sleep 
without my pizza in my arms”), matched in length and syllables to the consistent/inconsistent 
conditions. This condition provides a within-subjects baseline measure of the anomaly 
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detection N400 effect (note that this differs from Van Berkum’s study that tested semantic 
anomaly sentences in a separate experiment). In addition, 60 filler sentences were created to 
balance the number of sentences presented with anomalous/inconsistent content (as in Van 
Berkum et al., 2008). Thus, 30 sentences described ‘true’ events (e.g. “The dog usually sleeps 
in his basket in the living room”) and 30 sentences described ‘semantically correct’ 
information (e.g. “The Sahara is a place that is very dry and hot”). 
 Sentences were recorded by 14 different speakers. Sentences in the age category were 
read by four speakers: 2 adult speakers (one female and one male) and two child speakers 
(one female age 6 and one male age 8). Four adult speakers, 2 females and 2 males, read the 
sentences in the gender category, and four professional actors (2 males and 2 females) were 
recruited to imitate the stereotypical higher vs lower class British accents for the sentences in 
the class category (one male and one female to each class category). Audios were recorded in 
a sound proof room using a digital voice recorder. Two further adult speakers (one female 
and one male) read the filler sentences. All speakers were native speakers of English.  
 To ensure the validity of our items and speakers, we conducted a post-test, in which 
12 TD males and 12 TD females were asked to rate the plausibility of each experimental 
audio on a 5-point scale: “how normal or strange you think it is to have the speaker say this 
particular thing” (1 = completely normal, 5 = very strange). A 1-way ANOVA testing the 
effect of consistency (consistent vs inconsistent vs semantic anomaly) revealed a significant 
effect of consistency (F(2, 142) = 340.11, p < .001, η2 = .83), with participants rating the 
semantic anomalous (M = 3.80 vs 1.47, t = 22.09, p < .001) and inconsistent (M = 2.23 vs 
1.47, t = 11.85, p < .001) audios as less plausible, compared to the consistent ones. Semantic 
anomalous audios were also rated as less plausible compared to the inconsistent ones (M = 
3.80 vs 2.23, t = 15.98, p < .001). To verify that this consistency effect held for all three 
speaker types, we conducted separate 1-way ANOVAs for each speaker type (i.e. age, gender 
32 
 
and class). This revealed a significant effect of consistency for all three speaker types: (age: 
F(2, 142) = 226.58,  p< .001, η2 = .76; gender: F(2, 142) = 338.38, p < .001, η2 = .83; class: 
F (2, 142) = 278.93, p < .001, η2 = .80), reflecting the same pattern of lower plausibility 
ratings for semantic anomalous and inconsistent audios compared to consistent audios.  
Three presentation lists were created, with each list containing one hundred and sixty 
experimental items, 53 or 54 in each of the three conditions. The one hundred and sixty 
experimental items in each list were interspersed randomly among sixty unrelated filler 
sentences to create a single random order and each subject only saw each target sentence 
once, in one of the three conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to read each list. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were informed about the EEG procedure and experimental task. After electrode 
application they were seated in a booth where they listened to the spoken sentences through 
speakers, while a fixation cross was presented on a computer screen (presented using E-Prime 
software). There were two practice trials to familiarize participants with the procedure, after 
which the experimenter answered any questions. Each trial began with the presentation of a 
single centrally-located red fixation cross for 500 ms to signal the start of a new trial. After 
this time, a white fixation cross appeared for 500 ms. The target sentence was then presented 
auditorily, with the white fixation cross remaining on-screen throughout. A 1000 ms blank-
screen interval followed each item. There was no secondary task. Trials appeared in five 
blocks of 44 sentences, each lasting ~6 minutes. Each block was separated by a break, the 
duration of which was determined by the participant. The EEG task, including setup, took 
approximately 60 minutes to complete. 
 
EEG recording and data analysis  
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A Brain Vision Quickamp amplifier system was used with an ActiCap cap for continuous 
recording of electroencephalographic (EEG) activity from 30 active electrodes over midline 
electrodes Fz, Cz, Pz, and Oz, over the left hemisphere from electrodes Fp1, F3, F7, FC1, 
FC5, C3, T7, CP1, CP5, TP9, P3, P7, O1, and from the homologue electrodes over the right 
hemisphere. EEG and EOG recordings were sampled at 500 Hz, and electrode impedance 
was kept below 10 kΩ. Off-line, all EEG channels were recalculated to an average mastoid 
reference. 
 Prior to segmentation, EEG and EOG activity was band-pass filtered (.05-70 Hz, 12 
dB/oct), and EEG activity containing blinks was corrected using a semi-automatic ocular ICA 
correction approach (Brain Vision Analyzer 2). The continuous EEG record was then 
segmented into epochs of 2000 ms, starting 500 ms prior to the onset of the target word (e.g. 
‘teddy’ in the sentence “I cannot sleep without my teddy in my arms”). Thus, the post-
stimulus epoch lasted for a total duration of 1500 ms. Semi-automatic artifact detection 
software (Brain Vision Analyzer 2) was run, to identify and discard trials with non-ocular 
artifacts (drifts, channel blockings, EEG activity exceeding ±50 µV). This procedure resulted 
in an average of 43 trials retained for analysis, per condition. 
 Procedures for the analysis of EEG data replicated those used in Van Berkum’s study. 
First, the signal at each electrode site was averaged separately for each experimental 
condition, time-locked to the onset of the target word, and aligned to a 200 ms pre-target 
baseline. Mean ERP amplitude was determined in five time widows, replicating those used in 
Van Berkum et al. (2008) and in line with our pre-registered analysis plans: 100-200ms, 200-
300ms, 300-500ms, 500-700ms, and 200-700ms. ERP amplitudes over lateral electrodes sites 
were analysed using four regions of interest (ROIs). Lateral electrodes were divided along a 
left-right dimension, and an anterior-posterior dimension. The two ROIs over the left 
hemisphere were: left-anterior (Fp1, F7, F3, FC5, FC1), and left-posterior (CP5, CP1, P7, P3, 
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O1); two homologue ROIs were defined for the right hemisphere. ERP amplitudes over 
midline electrodes (Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz, Oz) were analysed in a single AOI, calculated by 
averaging data over the five electrodes, and analysed separately from data recorded over 
lateral electrode sites. 
 
Results 
All analysis procedures were pre-registered, and the full experimental materials, datasets and 
analysis scripts are available on the Open Science Framework web pages (see 
https://osf.io/7hna3/). 
Linear mixed models and lmer in the lme4 package in RStudio software were used to 
analyse the ERP data (Bates, et al., 2018; Version 1.1.453, R Core Team, 2016;). We note 
that our pre-registration planned to use ANOVAs to analyse the ERP data, replicating Van 
Bekrum et al. (2008), however in line with analyses for Experiment 1 and more recent 
statistical norms in the field, we adapted this plan to use linear mixed models since this 
allowed us to include random effects for both participants and items, and a maximal random 
effects structure. Thus, over lateral electrodes, each model included fixed effects of Group, 
AntPos, Hemisphere and Condition, and random effects for items and participants. Over the 
midline electrodes, each model included fixed effects of Group and Condition, and random 
effects for items and participants. Fixed effects with two levels (i.e. Group, Hemisphere, 
AntPos) were contrast coded (-.5 vs .5). To accommodate the three levels of Condition, we 
used deviation coded contrast schemes to compare each of the experimental conditions to the 
consistent reference level: Consistent vs. Inconsistent (Consistent (-.33), Inconsistent (.66), 
Anomalous (-.33)) and Consistent vs. Anomalous (Consistent (-.33), Inconsistent (-.33), 
Anomalous (.66)).  
The maximal random effects structure over lateral electrodes included crossed random 
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slopes for Group, AntPos, Hemisphere and Condition within items, and crossed random 
slopes for AntPos, Hemisphere and Condition within participants. Over midline electrodes, 
the maximal random effects structure included crossed random slopes for Group and 
Condition within items, and a random slope for Condition within participants. Some of the 
random slopes were removed later due to the non-convergence of the model (as suggested by 
Barr et al., 2013). The final models used to analyse the data across the different time 
windows are presented in the supplementary material. Note that due to space constraints, only 
significant or marginal (p ≤ .06) effects are presented in the text. Full statistical effects for 
each time window are summarised in Table 4, and grand average waveforms for each 




Table 4. Statistical results from the analysis of N400 effects over lateral and midline electrodes in Experiment 2, where · p<.1, * p<.05, ** 
p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
 
Est. SE t-value Est. SE t-value Est. SE t-value Est. SE t-value Est. SE t-value
AntPos 0.19 0.08 2.43 * 0.3 0.06 4.93*** 0.11 0.07 1.56 0.24 0.08 2.91** 0.22 0.07 3.41***
Hemisphere                                                                                    -0.07 0.05 -1.24 -0.24 0.06 -0.39 0.11 0.07 0.16 -0.02 0.08 -0.3 -0.01 0.07 -0.13
Group                                                                                     -0.05 0.12 -0.38 -0.16 0.12 -1.33 -0.13 0.15 -0.87 -0.22 0.16 -1.33 -0.17 0.14 -1.26
Consistent vs. Anomaly -0.12 0.11 -1.13 -0.13 0.08 -1.72 -0.25 0.13 -1.95 · -0.44 0.1 -4.38*** -0.31 0.15 -2.02*
Consistent vs. Inconsistent -0.23 0.12 -1.82 -0.23 0.08 -3.02** -0.22 0.12 -1.86 · -0.2 0.1 -1.96 · -0.22 0.14 -1.51
Ant-Pos*Hemisphere 0.04 0.11 0.4 0.02 0.12 0.15 -0.03 0.14 -0.22 -0.11 0.16 -0.73 0.01 0.13 0.08
Ant-Pos*Group                                                                   -0.01 0.15 -0.8 -0.34 0.12 -2.74** -0.26 0.14 -1.91 · -0.35 0.16 -2.12* -0.26 0.13 -1.97*
Hemisphere*Group 0.12 0.11 1.09 0.03 0.12 0.21 0.07 0.14 0.54 0.15 0.16 0.9 0.1 0.13 0.73
Ant-Pos*Consistent vs. Anomaly -0.11 0.13 -0.81 -0.09 0.15 -0.57 0.02 0.17 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.5 0.04 0.16 0.26
Ant-Pos*Consistent vs. Inconsistent -0.01 0.13 -0.12 -0.001 0.15 -0.57 0.02 0.17 0.14 -0.18 0.2 -0.92 -0.08 0.16 -0.48
Hemisphere*Consistent vs. Anomaly                    0 0.13 0 0 0.15 -0.01 0.03 0.17 0.18 0.06 0.2 0.31 0.05 0.16 0.3
Hemisphere*Consistent vs. Inconsistent 0.08 0.13 0.6 0.09 0.15 0.61 0.2 0.17 1.15 0.02 0.2 0.11 0.1 0.16 0.62
Group*Consistent vs. Anomaly 0.05 0.17 0.33 -0.16 0.15 -1.05 -0.17 0.26 -0.67 -0.26 0.2 -1.27 -0.23 0.23 -0.99
Group*Consistent vs. Inconsistent                                   0.19 0.21 0.88 0 0.15 -0.03 -0.26 0.23 -1.12 0.01 0.2 0.07 -0.12 0.22 -0.55
Ant-Pos*Hemisphere*Group                                                                    0.2 0.21 0.95 0.18 0.25 0.73 0.12 0.28 0.43 0.1 0.33 0.3 -0.12 0.26 0.96
Ant-Pos*Hemisphere*Consistent vs. Anomaly                       -0.16 0.26 -0.61 -0.16 0.3 -0.53 -0.2 0.34 -0.59 -0.13 0.4 -0.32 0.2 0.33 0.19
Ant-Pos*Hemisphere*Consistent vs. Inconsistent -0.04 0.26 -0.16 -0.12 0.3 -0.41 -0.19 0.34 -0.57 -0.32 0.4 -0.79 0.06 0.33 -0.78
Ant-Pos*Group*Consistent vs. Anomaly                            0.06 0.26 0.23 -0.12 0.3 -0.4 -0.2 0.34 -0.58 0.12 0.4 0.29 -0.26 0.33 0.4
Ant-Pos*Group*Consistent vs. Inconsistent                          0.03 0.26 -0.13 0.05 0.3 0.17 -0.07 0.34 -0.21 0.23 0.4 0.56 0.13 0.33 0.14
Hemisphere*Group*Consistent vs. Anomaly 0.21 0.26 0.79 0.23 0.3 0.77 0.36 0.34 1.05 0.63 0.4 1.57 0.05 0.33 1.44
Hemisphere*Group*Consistent vs. Inconsistent 0.32 0.26 1.22 0.45 0.3 1.48 0.41 0.34 1.2 0.53 0.4 1.31 0.46 0.33 1.4
Ant-Pos*Hemisphere*Group*Consistent vs. Anomaly               0.05 0.52 0.1 0.19 0.61 0.31 0.13 0.68 0.18 -0.05 0.81 -0.06 0.52 0.65 0.79
Ant-Pos*Hemisphere*Group*Consistent vs. Inconsistent 0.14 0.52 0.26 0.17 0.61 0.28 -0.02 0.68 -0.03 -0.07 0.81 -0.09 -0.05 0.65 -0.08
Group -0.19 0.12 -1.57 -0.35 0.14 -2.43* -0.36 0.18 -1.98 · -0.51 0.19 -2.62* -0.42 0.16 -2.55*
Consistent vs. Anomaly -0.24 0.13 -1.82 · -0.19 0.15 -1.25 -0.34 0.16 -2.12* -0.57 .19 -2.91** -0.40 0.16 -2.55*
Consistent vs. Inconsistent -0.37 0.15 -2.48* -0.31 0.17 -1.82 · -0.16 0.16 -1.02 -0.23 0.19 -1.26 -0.22 0.16 -1.41
Group*Consistent vs. Anomaly 0.21 0.27 0.78 -0.27 0.33 -0.83 -0.22 0.32 -0.68 -0.10 0.37 -0.26 -0.18 0.31 -0.57













100-200ms: Analyses revealed a significant effect of AntPos, with a more negative waveform 
over anterior electrode sites (M = -.24µV) compared to posterior electrode sites (M= -.05µV). 
More importantly, the speaker-inconsistency effect was significant over the midline 
electrodes, revealing a more negative wave in the inconsistent condition (M= -.45µV) 
compared to the consistent condition (M= -.09 µV). The semantic anomaly effect was 
marginally significant over the midline electrodes, showing a more negative wave in the 
semantic anomalous condition (M= -.32 µV) compared to the consistent condition (M= -
.09µV). The effect of Group was not significant, and Group did not interact with any other 
variables.  
 
200-300ms: A significant effect of AntPos once again showed a more negative waveform 
over anterior electrode sites (M= -.43µV) than posterior electrode sites (M= -.13µV). The 
speaker-inconsistency effect was significant over lateral electrodes and marginal over the 
midline, revealing a more negative wave in the inconsistent condition (Mlateral= -.40µV, 
Mcentral= -.59 µV) compared to the consistent condition (Mlateral= -.16µV, Mcentral= -.28µV) 
Over the midline electrodes there was a significant effect of Group, reflecting a more 
negative wave in the TD group (M= -.62µV) compared to the autistic group (M= -.27µV). 
There was also a significant interaction between Group and AntPos. Post-hoc comparisons 
revealed a more negative wave over anterior (M= -.45µV) compared to posterior electrodes 
(M= .02µV) in the autistic group (Est. = 0.45, SE = 0.17, t = 2.60, p = 0.015), but no 
difference in the TD group (t = 1.16, p = 0.258). None of the remaining effects or interactions 
involving Group or semantic anomaly were significant. 
 
300-500ms: The effects of speaker-inconsistency and semantic anomaly were marginally 
significant over the lateral electrodes, and the semantic anomaly effect was significant over 
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midline electrodes. As expected, the N400 was more negative for the inconsistent (M= -
.51µV) and semantic anomaly (M= -.52µV) conditions, compared to the consistent condition 
(M= -.29µV). The effect of Group was marginal over the midline electrodes, showing a larger 
overall N400 in the TD group (M= -.84µV) than the autistic group (M= -.49µV). None of the 
remaining effects or interactions involving Group reached significance.  
 
500-700ms: The effect of speaker-inconsistency was significant over the lateral electrodes, 
with a larger N400 in the inconsistent (M= -.50µV) compared to consistent condition (M = -
.30µV). The effect of semantic anomaly was significant over both lateral and midline 
electrodes, reflecting a larger N400 in the semantic anomaly condition (Mlateral= -.73µV, 
Mcentral= -1.00µV) compared to the consistent condition (Mlateral= -.30µV, Mcentral= -.44µV). 
Once again, the effect of Group was significant over the midline electrodes, with larger N400 
effects in the TD group (M = -.95µV) than in the autistic group (M = -.45µV). Post-hoc 
comparisons revealed a more negative wave over anterior (M= -.62µV) compared to posterior 
electrodes (M= -.21µV) in the autistic group (Est. = 0.40, SE = 0.19, t = 2.10, p = 0.048), but 
no difference in the TD group (t = 0.43, p = 0.669). None of the remaining effects or 
interactions involving Group reached significance.  
 
200-700ms: Analyses over lateral electrodes revealed a significant effect of AntPos, with a 
more negative N400 over anterior electrode sites (M = -.55µV) compared to posterior 
electrode sites (M = -.33µV). The semantic anomaly effect was significant over both lateral 
and midline sites, reflecting a larger N400 in the semantic anomaly condition (Mlateral= -
.56µV, Mcentral= -.83µV) compared to the consistent condition (Mlateral= -.27µV, Mcentral= -
.43µV). Over the midline, the N400 was significantly more negative in the TD group (M= -
.84 µV) compared to the autistic group (M= -.43). There was also a significant interaction 
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between Group and AntPos. Post-hoc comparisons revealed a more negative wave over 
anterior (M= -.54µV) compared to posterior electrodes (M= -.18µV) in the autistic group (Est. 
= 0.34, SE = 0.16, t = 2.10, p = 0.046), but no difference in the TD group (t = 0.89, p = 
0.383). None of the remaining effects or interactions involving Group reached significance.  
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Figure 4. Grand-average ERPs elicited by critical words in the autistic group (top panel) and TD group (bottom panel) for Consistent, 








First, the results of Experiment 2 replicated van Berkum et al.’s findings (2008), showing that 
individuals integrated their world knowledge (voice-based inferences in our study) and the 
semantics of the sentence to detect an inconsistency between the speaker’s voice and meaning as 
early as 200-300ms after hearing the critical word. Second, the speaker inconsistency effect 
emerged within a comparable timeframe to the semantic anomaly effect, perhaps even earlier. 
Thus, the results provide further evidence for the notion that language processing goes beyond 
processing the linguistic input, and that pragmatic processing can be activated immediately 
(Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 1999; Just, & Carpenter, 1980; Zwaan, 2004). Importantly, autistic 
individuals took the speaker’s voice into account as quickly as TD individuals, showing that they 
were as fast to integrate pragmatics and semantics. This pattern contrasts with theories that 
suggest autistic individuals have difficulties in using context while processing language (Tager-
Flusberg, Paul, & Lord, 2005). 
 
General Discussion 
In two pre-registered experiments we investigated the timecourse with which autistic and TD 
adults understand a speaker’s meaning based on characteristics inferred from the speaker’s 
voice. Experiment 1 used the visual world paradigm to capture the timecourse of anticipated 
meaning while participants listened to spoken sentences in which the speaker’s voice and 
message were either consistent or inconsistent (e.g. “When we go shopping, I usually look for 
my favourite wine”, spoken by an adult or a child). Experiment 2 recorded ERPs to examine 
integration of meaning while participants listened to spoken sentences that were either 
consistent or inconsistent in terms of voice and message, or semantically anomalous (e.g. “I 
cannot sleep without my pizza in my arms”). These experiments allowed us to test the general 
question of whether inferences about pragmatic meaning are activated online during language 
comprehension (i.e. linguistic input and context are processed in a single incremental step), or 
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whether these pragmatic inferences are delayed to a second step of language processing (i.e. 
individuals first extract the sentence’s message using syntax and semantics, and only 
integrate the speaker’s identity at a later stage of processing). Moreover, by comparing real-
time pragmatic processing of spoken language among autistic and TD people we investigated 
whether and how these processes are affected when global coherence and social abilities are 
compromised. Thus, we tested whether autistic adults would show disrupted use of context to 
infer meaning (i.e. replicating Happé, 1997; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999), or whether 
aspects of contextual language comprehension and perspective-taking are intact among 
autistic people (as seen in Au Yeung et al., 2014, 2018; Black et al., 2018, 2019; Ferguson et 
al., 2019; Williams & Happé, 2010). 
Results provided converging evidence that listeners rapidly and accurately anticipate a 
speaker’s intended meaning based on inferences from their voice. In Experiment 1, 
participants were faster to select the mentioned object when it was consistent with the 
speaker’s voice than when it was inconsistent. More importantly, eye movement data 
revealed a strong and increasing preference to fixate the object that was consistent with the 
speaker’s voice (i.e. the target) long before this object was disambiguated in the auditory 
input (~2000ms before). These incremental expectations were further evidenced in 
Experiment 2, as the N400 revealed that participants detected an inconsistency between the 
speaker’s voice and meaning as early as 200ms after hearing the critical word. This speaker 
inconsistency effect emerged within a comparable timeframe to the semantic anomaly effect. This 
suggests that listeners used the inferred speaker context to constrain their expectations about 
forthcoming language, in a similar way that semantics and linguistic discourse context constrain 
expected meaning (see Van Berkum, 2009).  
These findings therefore provide novel insights into the timecourse of social language 
understanding. In line with hypotheses from the one-step model of language processing, our 
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data support the proposal that social context (voice of speaker here) and the linguistic input 
are taken into account concurrently when we process language (Clark, 1996; Perry, 1997). 
This early and incremental anticipation was particularly evident in Experiment 1, where eye 
movements provided a novel measure of predictive processing, and showed that voice-related 
processes are activated even before hearing the socially-relevant contrasts (e.g. wine/sweets). 
Here, participants inferred characteristics of the speaker based on their voice (i.e. their age, 
gender or social class), and directed their eye movements to objects in the visual scene that 
were consistent with this prediction, and relevant to the content of their unfolding utterance. 
Importantly, Experiment 1 showed that pragmatic inferences about the speaker modified 
constraints based on lexical-semantic input. In other words, while both the sweets and wine 
fit the semantic constraints of objects that one can buy at the supermarket, world knowledge 
provided cues for participants to distinguish the most relevant option for the particular 
speaker (e.g. adults are more likely to buy wine than sweets). This suggests that pragmatic 
inferences about a speaker (based on their voice) have a strong and early influence on 
predictive language processing, and that this is comparable to the effects seen when world 
knowledge constraints have been explicitly defined in the language input (e.g. ‘The girl will 
ride the carousel/motorbike’; Kamide, Altmann, & Haywood, 2003). 
Further evidence of these rapid pragmatic inferences was seen in the ERP data in 
Experiment 2, which replicated and extended the results from Van Berkum et al. (2008)’s 
study. Here, the N400 was amplified for inconsistent speaker-meaning sentences relative to 
consistent speaker-meaning sentences. Indeed, speaker inconsistency effects emerged as early 
as 200ms after critical word onset. This suggests that listeners already had strong predictions 
about the unfolding language, and the sorts of objects the speaker was most likely to mention, 
based on world knowledge constraints activated by the speaker’s voice. This pattern provides 
further evidence that these social stereotypes can overrule lexical-semantic processing, since 
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both critical words are semantically appropriate to the sentence context, and one only 
becomes incongruent when meaning is interpreted based on inferred knowledge about the 
specific speaker. Moreover, our design allowed direct comparison of this pragmatic N400 
effect with a semantic anomaly condition, and revealed that the brain’s response to 
pragmatically infelicitous language is indistinguishable from that elicited by semantic fit. 
This shows that language comprehension is a dynamic process whereby people can rapidly 
access and integrate information based on the explicit and inferred context (including words, 
sentence, discourse, and world knowledge), then flexibly shift between these different 
constraints as appropriate. 
 Importantly, similar patterns of anticipation and integration based on speaker-meaning 
fit were found among autistic and TD people, despite the autistic group showing a significant 
impairment in explicitly recognizing the emotions of speakers from their voice (in the RMIV 
task). This finding provides evidence that autistic adults do not experience a general deficit in 
inferring social characteristics of speakers, or integrating information in context (as seen in 
Black et al., 2018, 2019; Ferguson et al., 2019; Koldewyn, et al., 2013; Mottron, et al., 2003; 
Plaisted et al., 2006; Van der Hallen et al., 2015). In Experiment 1, autistic participants 
successfully inferred the pragmatic context from the speaker’s voice, and directed their visual 
attention to anticipate mention of the speaker-relevant target object nearly 2000ms before 
disambiguation. In Experiment 2, autistic individuals inferred the spoken utterance’s pragmatic 
meaning as quickly as TD individuals, evidenced by deflections on the N400 to inconsistent 
speaker-meaning sentences within 200ms of hearing the critical word. These patterns provide a 
clear indication that autistic people are aware of social stereotypes, and can infer and apply 
these in real-time to constrain language comprehension. This is in line with previous research 
showing intact social knowledge in autism when judging attributions, such as race, age, social 
46 
 
status etc from faces or bodies (White, Hill, Winston, & Frith, 2006; Frith, 2007; Saldaña & 
Frith, 2007).  
This unimpaired anticipation of speaker meaning is unexpected based on accounts 
that characterise autism in terms of a reduced drive for global coherence (WCC account; 
Frith, 1989; Frith & Happé, 1994; Happé & Frith, 2006), disordered processing of complex 
information (Minshew & Goldstein, 1998; Minshew, Goldstein, & Siegel, 1997; Minshew, 
Williams, & McFadden, 2008), or atypical pragmatic integration (Happé, 1997; Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 1999; Nuske & Bavin, 2011). These accounts predict that autistic people 
would show impairments in using the context (the speaker’s voice here) to predict language. 
For example, the complex information processing theory suggests that autistic individuals 
struggle with integrating the information from multiple sources or components, so these 
individuals would struggle completing complex tasks that involve combining information 
from different components (Minshew, Goldstein, & Siegel, 1997). Yet data from both 
experiments here showed clear effects of speaker inferences among both groups of 
participants. Thus, the current results are consistent with recent research that has used 
implicit methods to show that autistic adults have an intact ability to integrate information 
online during language comprehension (Au-Yeung et al., 2018; Black et al., 2018, 2019; 
Ferguson et al., 2019; Howard et al., 2017b), and extend this by showing that global 
coherence of information in autism can go beyond ‘what is said’ to assess ‘who is saying 
what’. The intact contextual integration seen in Experiments 1 and 2 is also consistent with 
the results of the linguistic central coherence task, which did not find any evidence of a local 
processing bias among our autistic participants (c.f. Booth & Happé, 2010). Importantly, the 
fact that autistic individuals were impaired at explicitly inferring emotions from a speaker’s 
voice in the explicit RMIV task, suggests that although autistic individuals are unimpaired at 
integrating social stereotypes online, they struggle with extracting more complex information 
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offline, such as emotions, supporting the previous literature (Philip, et al., 2010; Jones et al., 
2011). Hence, future studies, should examine how these individuals process complex 
information, including emotions or mental states online, while extracting the meaning from 
language. 
Nevertheless, Experiment 1 revealed some subtle differences in the timecourse and 
strength of voice-based pragmatic inferences among TD and autistic participants, which 
might suggest that autistic people activated weaker speaker-meaning expectations or were 
less bound to these social stereotypes. First, the eye-tracking data showed that participants in 
the TD group biased their visual attention to the target object earlier than the autistic group 
(2240ms vs 1800ms before disambiguation), though this anticipatory bias in the TD group 
subsequently declined prior to a rapid increase (960ms before disambiguation), whereas the 
autistic group showed a consistent increase in target bias from 1800ms before the 
disambiguation point. Second, only the autistic group in Experiment 1 showed significant 
interference from the competitor object (i.e. the object that was semantically, but not 
pragmatically relevant to the context) during the anticipation period. Finally, analysis of the 
period after disambiguation (i.e. integration) showed faster switches away from the target in 
the inconsistent condition among the autistic group compared to the TD group (300ms vs 
400ms respectively).  
Taken together, these findings could suggest that autistic individuals are more likely 
to adopt a bottom-up (i.e. semantics first) approach to pragmatic language processing (Van 
den Brink et al., 2010), which means that they are less able to ignore pragmatically irrelevant 
information. This explanation is in line with the predictive coding theory of autism (Van 
Boxtel & Lu, 2013), which suggests that autistic people attribute greater weight to bottom-up 
errors due to meta-learning impairments, and consequently contextualise sensory signals in a 
less automatic way, especially when facing complicated unexpected input. Support for this 
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predictive coding theory of autism is particularly evident in the anticipatory data from 
Experiment 1, where autistic adults were successfully able to predict the speaker’s meaning 
based on their voice but were slower to do so, and exhibited weaker biases to the speaker-
relevant target. In an experimental setting, these subtle differences in timing and strength of 
predictions are not sufficient to disrupt comprehension, however it is likely that in real-world 
settings, where conversation is more fast-paced and involves greater distracting sensory 
input, these weaker top-down predictions can have a cumulative impact on social 
communication. Alternatively, the different patterns might reflect a more flexible use of 
social stereotypes among autistic individuals compared to their TD peers. Previous research 
has established that autistic individuals are able to recognise and use social stereotypes 
(including age and social status) despite profound difficulties in mental state reasoning 
(Hirschfield, Bartness, White, & Frith, 2007; White, Hill, Winston, & Frith, 2006). Our data 
might then demonstrate that autistic people are less constrained in automatically assigning 
meaning according to these usual/prototypical contexts (see Zalla, Amsellem, Chaste, Ervas, 
Leboyer, & Champagne-Lavau, 2014). These subtle differences between groups, despite 
intact overt understanding of social stereotypes in autistic individuals, are analogous to recent 
neuroimaging research that has shown distinct patterns of brain activation during speaker-
meaning integration, among autistic people and their TD peers (Groen, Tesink, Petersson, 
Van Berkum, Van der Gaag, Hagoort, 2009; Tesink, Buitelaar, Petersson, Van Der Gaag, 
Kan, Tendolkar, 2009). Based on these findings, researchers have proposed that autistic 
people recruit atypical brain areas to integrate social information, and may rely on 
compensatory mechanisms to integrate social contrasts.  
 Finally, we note some limitations with the current experiments. First, it is possible 
that we simply did not have sufficient power to detect the 3- and 4-way interactions that were 
tested in Experiment 2. Our sample size was chosen a-priori to achieve comparable 
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participant numbers in each group to the total sample size used in Van Berkum et al. (2008; N 
= 24), and to match or exceed the sample sizes used in previous studies in these areas, 
however post-hoc power analyses suggested that at least 68 participants would be needed in 
each group to reach the desired 80% power. Nevertheless, concerns about power are 
alleviated somewhat by our use state-of-the-art statistical methods which meant that analyses 
were run on individual data points rather than data aggregated across participants (thus 
improving power; Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008), which also allowed us to control for 
by-participant and by-item variation in a single analysis. Moreover, given that results from 
Experiment 2 replicated the patterns seen in Van Berkum et al. (2008), and that group did not 
modulate speaker consistency effects in any of the five pre-registered analysis time windows 
(in either the midline or lateral analyses), we can feel relatively confident that the reported 
findings are reliable. Nevertheless, as a field, research on autism should continue to aim for 
larger sample sizes, ideally recruiting participants with a diverse representation on the autism 
spectrum to ensure generalizability of results. Another point to consider is that this study did 
not test whether there were any differences between groups in terms of attitudes towards 
social stereotypes. For example, previous studies have shown that gender dysphoria is more 
prevalent among autistic than TD individuals, which could influence their attitudes towards 
gender stereotypes (Van Der Miesen, Hurley, & De Vries, 2016). Thus, future research 
should consider whether norms and expectations differ between autistic and TD individuals. 
Furthermore, since our autistic participants were impaired at explicitly recognising others’ 
emotions from their voices, future research should investigate whether subclinical emotional 
conditions, such as Alexithymia (prevalent among autistic people), correlates with the ability 
to understand external emotions in autism.  
In conclusion, the two experiments reported here employed complementary measures 
to assess online processing of spoken language among autistic and TD adults. Together they 
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provide strong evidence that language is processed in a single step, by showing that speaker-
related information (i.e. social context) is processed in parallel with the linguistic input, and 
can over-ride salient lexical-semantic input to influence listeners’ expectations of an 
unfolding utterance in real-time. Moreover, this ability to anticipate and integrate language 
meaning based on social inferences about the speaker was unimpaired among autistic people. 
This shows that autistic people are aware of social stereotypes, and can infer and apply these 
automatically to constrain language comprehension. Nevertheless, we observed subtle 
differences in the timecourse with which these processes are activated among autistic 
individuals, which might indicate a preference for bottom-up (i.e. language first) processing, 
or more flexible use of social stereotypes in this group. Further research is needed to 
determine how these social contrasts are applied in real life, where language is less structured 
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